



JHUMUNC
THE JOHNS HOPKINS MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Quadrumvirate: Yom Kippur War (1973)

Chaired by William Klink

Session XXIII

United States of America

Quadrumvirate: Yom Kippur War of 1973

Topic A: Planning Ahead & Coordinating U.S. Response

Topic B: Facilitating Ceasefire & Negotiating Lasting Peace

Committee Overview

Hello, and welcome to the situation room! You have all been chosen because you are the brightest national security minds in the United States and are uniquely suited to deal with conflicts worldwide.

Allow me to introduce myself: I am the 37th President of the United States, Richard Nixon. Beyond beginning detente with the Soviet Union, I have led a revolution in U.S. foreign policy. I have made Americans safer by signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty with the Soviets.¹ I have freed the Chinese from the oppressive hand of Soviet tyranny and split the Communist bloc in two.² I have overseen the expansion of U.S. dominance to the moon,³ a scientific and national achievement unparalleled in nearly all of human history.

Make no mistake, threats to the U.S. still abound in the form of proxy conflict. As such, during our time together we will focus on the Middle East. Regional tensions have been high since 1967 and have been made worse by Soviet weapons shipments to Egypt and Syria. Unfortunately, conflict appears inevitable. If conflict erupts, it may upset the delicate balance between the U.S.

and the USSR and harm our other allies in the region.

Also presiding over our proceedings is my National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He is uniquely suited to guide U.S. foreign policy. Since I find myself more consumed by domestic 'controversy' by the day, I have given Mr. Kissinger unprecedented authority as a representative of the United States; he should thus be considered an asset as events progress. He commands worldwide respect and his assent to any policy proposals or action plans will surely carry weight.

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (1990): 731-45.

² Ibid.

³ Rick Perlstein, "Watergate Scandal," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, July 8, 2019.

Parliamentary Procedure

If you have questions about parliamentary procedure, feel free to email me (wklink2@jhu.edu). However, please don't fixate too much on parliamentary procedure prior to the conference; I will review specifics and answer any questions you have before we start our first committee session. I have two requests prior to the conference:

First, don't pre-write your crisis notes or directives. It ruins the fun for other delegates and places you at a distinct disadvantage, as crisis committees are dynamic and require you to adapt to changing scenarios

Second, crisis committees reward delegates who think outside of the box. As such, do not be afraid to collaborate with others, both in and out of committee. There are three other committees in our Quadrumvirate, and bold cross-committee collaboration has the potential to greatly impact the outcome of events.



Delegate Biographies:

Kenneth Rush

Deputy Secretary of State

Second in command to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Deputy Secretary Rush works closely with Secretary Kissinger in the creation of State Department policy.⁴ Since he commands two roles, Secretary Kissinger spends most of his time orchestrating U.S. grand strategy. In order to handle his roles, Secretary Kissinger delegates much of his authority over State Department affairs to Deputy Secretary Rush. If Secretary Kissinger is incapacitated and unable to perform his duties, Deputy Secretary Rush must step in and assume the role of Secretary of State.⁵

Kenneth B. Keating

U.S. Ambassador to Israel

As the primary point of contact with Israel, Ambassador Keating interacts closely with Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Simcha Dinitz.⁶ Ambassador Keating is also responsible for articulating U.S. policy to Israel and facilitating bilateral cooperation when necessary. In the event of conflict, Ambassador Keating's duties will include conferring with prominent figures in the Israeli government to determine Israeli needs and help craft a U.S. response.⁷ If conflict winds down quickly and judiciously and the conversation shifts towards peace talks, Ambassador Keating stands to play an important role in understanding Israel's goals and taking

necessary actions to ensure that any settlement reflects those goals when they align with the strategic interests of the United States.

John A. Scali

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

If we are to achieve our goal of lasting peace in the Middle East, it will take a gargantuan international effort through the United Nations. As U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Scali's engagement with other members of the Security Council will prove crucial to our success. Beyond the Security Council, Ambassador Scali must ensure that all states see the validity of and accept UN Resolution 242, which passed in 1967 and will underpin any U.S. efforts to achieve peace.⁸

L. Dean Brown

U.S. Ambassador to Jordan

As one of Israel's two neighbors with whom we have formal diplomatic relations (the other being Lebanon), Jordan will prove crucial to any efforts at ending the destructive cycle of violence harming the region.⁹ As Ambassador to Jordan, Ambassador Brown is responsible for articulating U.S. policy to Jordan and facilitating bilateral cooperation when possible.¹⁰ If war erupts, as we anticipate, Ambassador Brown will need to reassure Jordanians that we act solely to bring peace to the region. After any conflict winds

⁴ "Deputy Secretary of State - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Paul Lewis, "Simcha Dinitz, 74, Ex-Israeli Envoy; Had Role in Disputed Airlift," *The New York Times*, September 24, 2003.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "UN Resolution 242," United Nations.

⁹ "U.S. Relations With Jordan - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State.

¹⁰ Ibid.

down and the conversation shifts towards peace in the Middle East, Ambassador Brown must work to understand Jordan's concerns and ensure that any U.S. plan is agreeable to King Hussein.

Jacob T. Beam

U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

I have led the U.S. into a glorious new period of relations with the Soviets: detente.¹¹ We have agreed to avoid small squabbles and dedicate ourselves to arms limitation agreements. However, conflict in the Middle East threatens to unravel detente. The Soviets have been haphazardly supplying Israel's Arab neighbors with weapons, increasing tensions in the region.¹² As the U.S.' primary diplomatic contact with the Soviet Union, Ambassador Beam must ensure Soviet cooperation or acquiescence to our plans to bring peace to the region. Many of Ambassador Beam's diplomatic efforts must take place with the UN in mind, as any long-term peace will come through the Security Council.

James E. Akins

U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

The U.S. lacks both the means to produce prodigious amounts of domestic oil and the necessary stockpiles; thus, U.S. dependence on the Saudis is at an all-time high.¹³ If conflict erupts, Ambassador Akins must placate Saudi concerns. Chief among those concerns is the fate of the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia's King Fahd sees himself as a unifying figure in the Muslim world and has worked to aid the Palestinians. Therefore, although not contiguous with Israel, Saudi Arabia believes that it has a

stake in the outcome of any Arab-Israeli war and will certainly work to influence regional events to its benefit. The Saudis will face a dilemma in the event of conflict: should they continue to support Western countries, who have been reliable consumers of their oil, or should they retaliate in a unified anti-Israeli front? Diplomatic efforts from Ambassador Akins must work to address this.

William J. Porter

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

In his capacity as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Porter has a wide purview in the crafting of the State Department's worldwide and regional policymaking. Ambassador Porter oversees all State Department regional Assistant Secretaries, including the Assistant Secretaries for African Affairs as well as Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹⁴ Any conflict involving Israel will surely necessitate close cooperation between both offices. Ambassador Porter also oversees the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, who crafts and coordinates the State Department's messages and policies towards multilateral organizations. This includes, but crucially, is not limited to, the United Nations.

¹¹ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Détente," Encyclopædia Britannica, May 1, 2017.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ "U.S. Imports from Saudi Arabia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products," U.S. Imports from Saudi Arabia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day).

¹⁴ "Under Secretary for Political Affairs - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State.

Curtis W. Tarr

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs

As Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Undersecretary Tarr has widespread authority in a number of areas. First, Undersecretary Tarr oversees the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, whose work will be crucial for the maintenance of any Middle East peace.¹⁵ A lasting peace will most likely require that all states in the region adhere to some sort of arms control policy, which must be verifiable by diplomatic, intelligence, and military sources. Next, Undersecretary Tarr oversees the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, who works to ensure cooperation between the State Department and the military.¹⁶ Given current threat levels in the Middle East, the U.S. will most likely be involved militarily and diplomatically. If, for example, the actions taken by the U.S. military differ from the diplomatic promises made by the State Department, we will lose international credibility and be less likely to negotiate a lasting peace. Finally, Undersecretary Tarr oversees the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which will prove crucial if any conflict escalates to the point of nuclear war.¹⁷

James S. Sutterlin

State Department Director of Policy Planning

The State Department is a complicated organization whose staff are often consumed with day-to-day minutiae. They have thus outsourced much of the bigger picture considerations relating to grand strategy to the Director of Policy Planning.¹⁸ Secretary Kissinger trusts that Director

Sutterlin will provide policy analysis for the State Department's long-term strategy.¹⁹ More so than most regions in the world, the United States needs to develop a long-term vision for the Middle East. We have a number of strategic interests in the region that need to be protected. Much of the focus will naturally be on militarily securing those areas; however, diplomacy is crucial as well. We can use as much force in the region as we want, but if every surrounding country disapproves of the U.S. presence, we will not have success. Therefore, Director Sutterlin must weigh in on every U.S. action taken in the region to ensure that short-term choices don't contravene long-term goals.

William E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

In his capacity as Director of Central Intelligence, Director Colby will play a crucial role in any events that unfold. Although the United States has multiple intelligence agencies, the CIA has a long history of operations in foreign countries and is particularly active in the Middle East. Director Colby is also responsible for coordination with the Israeli intelligence agencies before, during, and after any potential conflict. Beyond responding to immediate concerns, Director Colby has a longer-term goal: fortifying the U.S. intelligence presence in the Middle East to protect U.S. allies and interests.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ "About Us - Policy Planning Staff - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Vincent P. De Poix

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency

As DIA Director, Vice Admiral De Poix tends to the Department of Defense's main intelligence provider.²⁰ With a large degree of independence and an extensive purview, the Defense Intelligence Agency keeps the defense community supplied with information about troop movements and enemy weapons usage. Beyond its human intelligence (HUMINT) work, the DIA also conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT).²¹ With technology improving daily, our ability to accurately surveil our adversaries from space may be the deciding factor in conflicts going forward. In his capacity, Vice Admiral De Poix is able to report on troop movements to aid in strategizing against our enemies and, crucially, will be among the first to know of any ceasefire violations. As such, our SIGINT capabilities are crucial to maintaining peace in the Middle East. I trust that Vice Admiral De Poix recognizes the centrality of satellite surveillance and will take steps to ensure that our SIGINT is able to help us better analyze the challenges in the region.

Ray S. Cline

Director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Diplomacy is a difficult enterprise; it often forces us to place trust in actors whose intentions we are unsure of. However, with accurate intelligence, our diplomats will be better informed when negotiating with both our adversaries and allies. This is where Ambassador Cline comes in. As Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Ambassador Cline operates the primary intelligence arm of the State Department to

support the information needs of the Secretary.²²

Thomas H. Moorer

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the highest-ranking military official in the country, Admiral Moorer oversees the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines around the world and advises the White House's military policy.²³ The level of U.S. military involvement in any conflict in the Middle East is of crucial importance. Tensions in the region are high and we may soon see conflict erupt. However, heavy-handed preemptive military action will surely provoke criticism and retaliation. As such, Admiral Moorer must determine appropriate levels of any U.S. military aid to Israel and help facilitate the transfer of that aid. As conflict winds down, Admiral Moorer must work with other military officials to determine an appropriate U.S. presence in the Middle East to protect vital interests.

²⁰ "Home," Defense Intelligence Agency.

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Bureau of Intelligence and Research - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State.

²³ "Home," Joint Chiefs of Staff.

James R. Schlesinger

Secretary of Defense

As the leader of the Department of Defense, Secretary Schlesinger's power to conduct the military is second only to mine. In the event of conflict, Ambassador Schlesinger must determine an appropriate U.S. strategy that will quickly end hostilities, minimize U.S. boots on the ground, and prevent escalation to worldwide conflict.²⁴ After any conflict, Secretary Schlesinger must collaborate with Admiral Moorer and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine U.S. policy towards the Middle East.²⁵ Secretary Schlesinger bears responsibility for 'bigger picture' ideas that will improve security for U.S. strategic interests worldwide. We are highly dependent on Middle Eastern oil²⁶ and long-term protection of our oil-producing allies should be considered.

John W. Warner

U.S. Secretary of the Navy

As Secretary of the Navy, Captain Warner's actions are crucial for our overall success. Should conflict break out requiring direct involvement of U.S. forces, the Navy's main goal should be attaining maritime supremacy. Maritime supremacy consists of control over our maritime lines of communication while preventing our adversaries from utilizing their lines of communication.²⁷ Our ability to attain maritime supremacy will have immediate consequences in the Middle East and at home. For instance, if we need to deliver aid to the Israelis, much of it will likely come via

ships on the Mediterranean Sea. In the event of conflict, we will also need to protect oil shipments originating Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other Persian Gulf countries that are destined for the U.S. and Europe.²⁸ Disruption of shipments will likely increase prices at home and hurt the domestic economy. After conflict ends, the U.S. will most likely need a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Suez Canal.²⁹ Captain Warner is responsible for positioning our forces to ensure these long-term outcomes.

John L. McLucas

Acting Secretary of the Air Force

As Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary McLucas must ensure that the U.S. attains air superiority if necessitated by conflict. Similar to maritime superiority, air superiority consists of preventing our adversaries from conducting operations in the air.³⁰ In 1967, Israel struck a devastating blow to its neighbors by preemptively destroying their air forces.³¹ However, if conflict breaks out again, we may not have that luxury and may have to take more extensive actions to control air space in the region. Air superiority will also help the U.S. prevent nuclear first strikes should they come via bombers. Although the Soviets have invested significant capital in their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), they may decide to use bombers should they opt for a first strike, as bombers are slower and can be recalled if necessary.³² Secretary McLucas is also currently Director of the National Reconnaissance

²⁴ Robert M. Gates, Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, December 21, 2010.

²⁵ "Home," Joint Chiefs of Staff.

²⁶ John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 401, (May, 1972), pp. 126-135.

²⁷ United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations, "A Design for Maintaining Naval Supremacy," December 2018.

²⁸ Jim Byron, "How Richard Nixon Saved Israel," Richard Nixon Foundation, September 8, 2016.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ "Doctrine Advisory: Control of the Air," United States Air Force, July 31, 2017.

³¹ "Israel After the Six Day War," mfa.gov.il, 2013.

³² Uri Bar-Noi, "The Soviet Union And The Six-Day War: Revelations From The Polish Archives," The Wilson Center, July 7, 2011.

Office. However, he is understood to have handed off his responsibilities to his deputies in order to better conduct his duties as Secretary of the Air Force.³³

Bo Callaway

Secretary of the Army

Make no mistake, Secretary Callaway commands the best army in the world. In the case of conflict, the Army should stand ready to interfere if necessitated by events on the ground. However, the Army has significant purview to send ‘advisors’ into conflict zones without declaring war, which would require Congressional authorization.³⁴ In an advisory capacity, small groups of our best-trained soldiers can help turn the tide of war towards our allies. In the long-term, our officers should continue to serve in an advisory capacity for our Middle Eastern allies.³⁵ Military superiority is the best means of protecting our allies and deterring those who seek to do them harm. Secretary Callaway should consider potential locations for U.S. Army bases in the Middle East to protect and train our allies.

Alexander Haig

White House Chief of Staff

As White House Chief of Staff, General Haig has no legally defined role other than serving as advisor. However, General Haig and I maintain a close relationship, and I have delegated many tasks to him over the past on an ad hoc basis. General Haig also influences who has access to me, how much access they receive, and the nature of the information that reaches my desk in the oval office.³⁶ I have placed significant trust in Mr. Haig’s ability to inform me of world

events and political considerations. As such, I consider one of Mr. Haig’s chief duties the protection of my presidency by ensuring that actions taken by cabinet officials, National Security Council members, and me are within my (and the U.S.’) best interest.

Spiro Agnew

Vice President

As Vice President of the United States, Vice President Agnew’s role and influence is subject to his discretion.³⁷ However, his title carries significant weight and respect in all circles throughout the U.S. government. In addition to advising me, Vice President Agnew can form commissions and working groups to create U.S. government policy, request information from government officials, and presides over the Senate.³⁸ In the event of conflict, we may need to request supplemental appropriations from Congress. In this case, Vice President Agnew’s support and relations with Senate leadership will be of paramount importance.

³³ “Dr. John L. McLucas,” U.S. Air Force, ed. December 1, 2002.

³⁴ James A. Warren, “U.S. Combat Advisers in Vietnam Knew the Score and Got Ignored,” *The Daily Beast*, February 3, 2018.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Tim Weiner, “Alexander M. Haig Jr. Dies at 85; Was Forceful Aide to 2 Presidents,” *The New York Times*, February 20, 2010.

³⁷ “Spiro Agnew,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, November 7, 2019.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Leonard Garment

White House Counsel

As White House Counsel, Mr. Garment is my official lawyer and primary advisor on the legality of my decisions.³⁹ My presidency and achievements have been groundbreaking; in the process, however, I have run afoul of my opponents and they have accused me of overstepping the bounds of my constitutional responsibilities. As such, Mr. Garment figures to be busy, protecting me and ensuring that my activities are deemed constitutional by the right people. Due to his skill and expertise as White House Counsel, Mr. Garment occupies a powerful position in the West Wing in that he can shape policy by determining its legality.

Brent Snowcroft

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

As Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Lt. General Snowcroft acts as Secretary Kissinger's direct deputy on the National Security Council.⁴⁰ Although not operating under an official government agency, Lt. General Snowcroft's position in the White House provides him with direct access to Secretary Kissinger and me. Both the Secretary and I are often busy making long-term decisions and we thus rely greatly on Lt. General Snowcroft's ability to provide us with information and policy advice.

³⁹ "Presidential Departments," The White House (The United States Government).

⁴⁰ Matt Spetalnick, "Trump Asia Expert to Become New Deputy National Security Adviser: Sources," *Reuters*, September 20, 2019.



Topic A:

Planning Ahead & Coordinating the U.S. Response

Introduction

Tensions are high in the Middle East. The region threatens to devolve into all-out conflict for the second time in six years. In 1967, after receiving intelligence of an imminent and coordinated strike, Israel preemptively wiped out the forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Since Israel's victory, the country has had effective control of the Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.⁴¹ Israel's territorial expansion has remained a significant area of tension since 1967. Egypt and Syria in particular are understood to resent Israel's gains. Their activities should be monitored to ensure the safety of our ally, Israel.

Any conflict in the Middle East risks upsetting U.S. strategic interests in the region and spreading past the region to involve the Soviets. As such, our main goal in any conflict must be quick and judicious de-escalation.

Regional Action

Aid and Intelligence

The U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship has improved greatly during my Presidency. Israel's ties to the United States are crucial for the maintenance of our regional hegemony. As delegates, you must do what is necessary in order to ensure Israel's continued existence and prosperity.

Israel handily defeated its attackers in 1967 and gained territory. Despite their continued strength and military prowess, Israel is still at risk. Unlike in 1967, the Arab

states surrounding Israel, namely Egypt and Syria, have benefited greatly from Soviet military assistance.⁴² They possess modern, Soviet-built weaponry that could easily be used on Israeli forces and citizens. In addition, every state bordering Israel seeks its destruction. In the event of an attack, the delegation must assume that other Arab and Muslim states will join the attack. Their support may be financial or military in nature.

In the event of a surprise attack, we will not be able to fully replenish Israel's forces. However, any aid we give can and most likely will turn the tides of the war. It is up to you, my counsel of experts, to determine the types and quantities of military aid that an invasion calls for. You must also devise the proper means of delivery of aid. We have the resources at our disposal in the region, and I expect my Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that any aid arrives safely to its intended destination. However, we must be judicious here; early or pre-emptive delivery of military aid may be viewed by Israel's neighbors and the Soviets as a precursor to another pre-emptive attack. If Israel goes to war with U.S. aid, it must only be defensive.

Beyond delivery of aid to help the Israelis turn the tide and overcome an Arab invasion, we must use the intelligence resources at our disposal to monitor for potential attacks. If our monitoring ability and intelligence resources are as strong as intelligence suggests, we should be able to

⁴¹ "Israel After the Six Day War," mfa.gov.il, 2013.

⁴² Jim Byron, "How Richard Nixon Saved Israel," Richard Nixon Foundation, September 8, 2016.

predict the troop movements of any potential attackers.

We should also use our intelligence resources to monitor any potential Soviet arms shipments. We ought to be prepared for the Soviets to counter any aid deliveries we make with further aid of their own. We must take necessary diplomatic actions in order to convince the Soviets of the futility of further weapons transfers. However, should diplomacy fail, we must take alternative covert actions to prevent Soviet aid from reaching the battlefield.

The Twin Pillars

The revolutionary states of Egypt and Syria are the largest current threats both to Israel and other states in the region; their leaders preach the abolition of monarchical states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. As the “Twin Pillars” of our Middle East policy, Saudi Arabia and Iran’s stability is crucial to our security.⁴³ If an invasion of Israeli is allowed to succeed, it will empower anti-regime forces in Saudi Arabia and Iran. This will destabilize the region and place undue pressure on global oil prices.

We must increase our intelligence gathering operations in both Saudi Arabia and Iran and work with domestic intelligence agencies. Anti-government forces may attempt to act against Saudi Arabia and Iran if the revolutionary states attack Israel. We cannot risk further instability in the region.

Despite our friendship with the “Twin Pillars,” Saudi Arabia and Iran will most likely not react favorably if we need to deliver aid to Israel. Additional effort must be taken to ensure that they do not retaliate

along with other Arab states against us. Arms sales and military aid may calm the Shah and the King; however, we must maintain diplomatic ties here as well. Should any conflict increase in intensity, a U.S. troop presence in the region may be required, which would enrage the Saudis.⁴⁴ Every action must be taken to prevent escalation of Middle East conflict.

The Bigger Picture

Nuclear Weapons

The United States holds the distinction as the only country on earth to detonate nuclear weapons on the battlefield. We have done it twice before, but should not do it again, as the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States are large enough to destroy the world many times over. At the moment, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is Leonid Brezhnev, who is currently supplying aid to the Egyptian and Syrian revolutionary states.⁴⁵ U.S. Intelligence believes that he controls a substantial nuclear weapons stockpile, so great care must be taken in negotiating and communicating with the Soviet Union.

Any conflict in the region would be a proxy war and must be treated as such in our contingency plans. Therefore, we must understand Moscow’s interests in the region, in particular their partnership with the Egyptians and the Syrians.⁴⁶ The Soviets carry significant leverage with Hafez al-Assad of Syria and Anwar Sadat of Egypt and must be viewed as indispensable negotiating partners.

In the long term, we desire peace in the Middle East. However, our long-term

⁴³ “U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations.

⁴⁴ Ahmed Al Omran, “Saudi Welcome for US Troops Reflects Relations with Mohammed Bin Salman,” *Financial Times*, July 23, 2019.

⁴⁵ Uri Bar-Noi, “The Soviet Union And The Six-Day War: Revelations From The Polish Archives,” The Wilson Center, July 7, 2011.

⁴⁶ John C. Campbell, “The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 401, (May, 1972), pp. 126-135.

plans cannot come at the expense of short-term necessities. As we transition towards developing a lasting peace, we should discuss how to best position ourselves to maintain our status as the dominant regional power while undermining the Soviets.

Fighting a Limited Nuclear War

Although we do not particularly like nuclear weapons and must do everything in our power to prevent nuclear war, we should also make preparations to limit the damage of such a war should it occur.⁴⁷

Since the early 1960s, the United States has adhered to a warfighting doctrine for nuclear warfare. Under our current strategic doctrine, we retain the capability to win a limited nuclear war against our enemies.⁴⁸ The opposite strategic doctrine, to which we adhered during the Eisenhower years, is minimal deterrence. Minimal deterrence states that, in response to a nuclear attack or significantly disruptive non-nuclear attack, we reserve the right to retaliate massively and attempt to destroy our enemy completely.⁴⁹ Obviously a policy that forces us to destroy our enemies completely is not credible, hence our switch to a warfighting doctrine.⁵⁰

Our adherence to warfighting doctrine has three consequences should we enter a nuclear war. First, certain non-nuclear attacks may warrant a non-nuclear response.⁵¹ For example, should the Soviet Union attempt to invade the region, we may decide that a tactical nuclear attack directed at their forces is the only effective countermeasure. We may also want to

entertain the public threat of a nuclear attack in order to compel our adversaries to stop their actions.⁵² We must be careful that any threat we make is credible. In other words, we cannot threaten to use nuclear weapons more than once. If other nations see that we have made the threat and not acted on that threat, then the threat will lose credibility.

Second, if a limited nuclear war begins, we will attempt to respond proportionately to any enemy actions. Assuming any U.S. use of nuclear weapons will cause a Soviet response and vice versa, a proportional response theoretically allows us to keep any nuclear war limited and create space for diplomacy to end the war.

Third, we will only target our enemy's forces.⁵³ Since our adoption of a warfighting doctrine in the 1960s, we have purposely avoided attacking civilian targets, or 'value' targets. In other words, we adhere to a counterforce targeting doctrine, not a countervalue targeting doctrine. When we adhered to massive retaliation, we were forced to target Soviet cities and civilians, a threat that was not credible and contained severe ethical and moral issues. Likewise, targeting civilians will not help us win whatever conflict we are fighting.⁵⁴ If the enemy's cities are destroyed but their forces remain, they will still be capable of fighting. If their forces are destroyed, their ability to fight will be diminished.

Since we will target military forces, which are constantly on the move and subject to change, you must determine what those targets are. This will require close collaboration between our intelligence

⁴⁷Elbridge Colby, "If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War," *Foreign Affairs*, January 28, 2019.

⁴⁸Todd South, Stephen Losey, and Kristine Froeba, "Blast from the Past: The Pentagon's Updated War Plan for Tactical Nukes," *Military Times*, July 18, 2019.

⁴⁹Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.

⁵⁰Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (1990): 731-45.

⁵¹Tyler Cowen, "A Nuclear First Strike Should Still Be an Option for America," *Bloomberg*, February 5, 2019.

⁵²Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).

⁵³Robert McNamara, "The No Cities Doctrine," in *The Use of Force*, ed. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, 3rd ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

⁵⁴Ibid.

agencies, both SIGINT and HUMINT, and our military forces. Once you have determined what our targets should be, you must also determine which targets are high priority.

Generally, the enemy's nuclear facilities and support stations should be considered the first priority.⁵⁵ Second, you should target the enemy's command, control, and communication (C3).⁵⁶ In simple terms, effective C3 enables enemy leadership to decide to retaliate with nuclear weapons and successfully communicate that decision down the chain of command. Your third targeting priority should be troops, tanks, airfields, and weapons depots in the region.⁵⁷ Targeting of troops, tanks, airfields, and weapons depots may also require delegation of tactical nuclear launch authority to field commanders who can make quick decisions. Fourth, you should target lines of communication and supply such as roads and railroads.⁵⁸ Finally, should nuclear war expand beyond a limited conflict, you must target enemy economic facilities.⁵⁹

Should nuclear war begin, we must also assume that our forces will be targeted. In this case, you must devise the strategies and tactics that protect our forces from attack by nuclear weapons, if at all possible.

Finally, the diplomats in this committee are not sidelined in any nuclear war. Limited nuclear war theoretically allows time for diplomats to attempt to end the conflict and minimize casualties. You will need to work closely with Soviet delegates to ensure that the U.S. understands their priorities and desires.

⁵⁵Harold Brown, "The Countervailing Strategy," in *The Use of Force*, ed. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, 3rd ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Domestic Politics

Deliberate Actions

In the swamp that is Washington, D.C., political considerations can never be separated from the conduct of the United States. My approval ratings are currently at a low, and the public doubts my ability to conduct our nation's foreign policy.⁶⁰ Although I have acted in earnest to judiciously end the conflict in Vietnam through my Vietnamization policy, the short-term effects of the policy have proven substantially less capable than anticipated.⁶¹ Therefore, although we must act in earnest to prepare for a possible attack on Israel, we must not create the impression that we are walking into "another Vietnam." This unfortunate reality has two crucial consequences for our actions:

First, we must act deliberately. In other words, every action we take must have an immediate purpose or be a direct response to a direct crisis. Thus, we must avoid large-scale pre-emptive demonstrations of force, which would surely force the escalation of conflict.

Second, we must act quietly. Although aid to Israel would most likely require some sort of supplemental appropriations from Congress, our policies and actions in any conflict begin and end in the executive branch.

Rally Around the Flag

The 'rally around the flag' phenomenon is well-documented. When a state enters and succeeds in a military conflict, its citizens 'rally around the flag' and increase support for the President and

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰Andrew Kohut, "From the Archives: How the Watergate Crisis Eroded Public Support for Richard Nixon," *Pew Research Center*, September 25, 2019.

⁶¹History.com Editors, "Vietnamization," *History*, (A&E Television Networks), February 24, 2010.

the government as a whole.⁶² Therefore, while maintaining utmost secrecy prior to taking action, we must promote our actions should they succeed. Success in preventing or mitigating another Arab-Israeli conflict has the potential to increase domestic support.

Should a war break out, we must control public opinion. This consists of tightly controlling information from the battlefield and appealing to Republican Congressional Representatives and Senators to publicly back our conduct of the conflict. Our goal in controlling public opinion should be to give the people of the U.S. and the world the impression that this government is capable of successfully leading the country through an international crisis.

⁶²James M. Lindsay, "Rally 'Round the Flag," *Brookings*, July 28, 2016.

Questions to Consider

1. *What exactly would U.S. involvement in a regional conflict look like?*

Will we be required to provide air support, put troops on the ground, or use our Navy to protect shipping lanes? We must respond proportionately to any situation in the region in order to protect our allies but also be wary of potential involvement from the Soviets and increasing anti-U.S. sentiments in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

2. *What message should the U.S. relay to the USSR?*

The USSR is already involved in the region through the supply of weapons to Egypt and Syria. The U.S. cannot take any action that could be construed as ending detente by provoking the Soviets or unilaterally escalating regional tensions.

3. *How can the United States prevent the isolation of our other allies in the region?*

If we are forced to come to Israel's aid, other countries in the region may retaliate. Saudi Arabia and Iran form the crux of our 'Twin Pillars' strategy in the Middle East and cannot think that we are abandoning them in favor of the Israelis.

4. *If Israel is subject to a devastating first strike from their neighbors, what should the U.S. do to ensure the country's continued existence?*

What type of aid could be feasibly delivered to allow Israel to respond proportionately? Who would negotiate the delivery of that aid? Which branch(es) of the military would take responsibility for the aid's safe delivery?

5. *How will our intelligence agencies operate in any conflict?*

They will have information, but how will they use it and who will they share it with? Which areas in the region are important to surveil? What is the right balance between HUMINT and SIGINT?

6. *In the event of a conflict, how can we quickly de-escalate tensions and end fighting quickly?*

This must be our primary goal, as continued escalation will lead to the involvement of other actors, namely the Soviets.

7. *Within Egypt and Syria, which actors have favorable attitudes towards the U.S.?*

If those actors exist, how can they be engaged? If engagement is not possible through official diplomatic channels, how can our diplomats engage in discrete discussions aimed at showing Israel's contiguous neighbors the benefits that come with an alliance with the U.S. and the recognition of Israel's right to exist?

Conclusion

We live in dangerous times. War threatens to engulf the Middle East for the second time in less than a decade. Given our substantial interests and investments in the region, we must do everything possible to prevent war from occurring.

However, should war occur, we must be prepared to protect our allies. This mainly concerns Israel, but also includes the “Twin Pillars,” Saudi Arabia and Iran. Protecting our allies will require action from all facets of the executive branch: our wonderful diplomats, fierce armed forces, and cunning intelligence operatives.

Should the conflict escalate, we must prepare for all eventualities. This,

unfortunately, includes nuclear war. Since the 1960s, the United States has adhered to a warfighting doctrine in which we prepare to win any nuclear war into which we enter. Although nuclear war may seem a purely military consideration, it must also involve our intelligence officers, who will have the best information on potential targets, and our diplomats, who must act with prudence and speed to end the conflict before the world is destroyed.

Beyond the international considerations, there are domestic considerations too. My approval ratings are abysmally low but may be improved if we coordinate a successful response to conflict in the Middle East.



Topic B:

Facilitating Ceasefire & Lasting Peace

Introduction

The tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors has proven to the U.S. and the rest of the world that the current status quo of Arab-Israeli relations is unsustainable. As such, the U.S. faces a gargantuan task of re-defining Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors to create a regional atmosphere that substantially reduces the likelihood of conflict while still ensuring that U.S. interests in the Middle East are maintained. This challenge necessitates cooperation within the U.S. amongst its military, politicians, and diplomats as well as international cooperation between the members of the UNSC.

If the region devolves into conflict again as we fear, the U.S. must establish and implement a United Nations Security Council-backed ceasefire before turning to discussions of lasting peace. Any ceasefire must be simultaneously agreeable to Israel, its Arab neighbors, and UNSC members as well as enforceable. All these factors and more must be considered as committee progresses; nothing less than the fate and wellbeing of the entire world depends on the success of our efforts.

Ceasefire

U.S. Goals

A ceasefire is not a permanent cessation of conflict (that would come in the form of a United Nations Security Council Resolution), but rather a temporary halt to hostilities in order to allow diplomatic actors to negotiate. Any ceasefire must be

verifiable, durable, and agreeable to all sides in the conflict.

When considering a ceasefire, the most important factor is verification. In other words, after a ceasefire is agreed to in principle, can we ensure that none of the countries involved in hostilities violate its terms? Any violation nullifies the ceasefire and has the potential to lead to further escalations in the conflict.

To ensure a verifiable ceasefire, we must create a monitoring mechanism. We have multiple options at our disposal, ranging from troop deployments to technological and radar-based solutions. If we decide to deploy troops, we must take special caution to ensure that American lives are not put at risk. With the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, the public and media would not look favorably upon further entrenchment in an overseas conflict. A United Nations peacekeeping force is the preferred option.

A durable ceasefire can outlast diplomatic bickering. It is likely that the combatants will be intransigent in discussions. Israel would be concerned with the defense of its territory and its people from states who do not believe it has a right to exist. Egypt and Syria were embarrassed by their massive military and territorial defeats in 1967. Their leaders Anwar Sadat and Hafez al-Assad, respectively, have much to gain from capturing lost territory. However, they also have much to lose from further defeat.

Of course, the verifiability and durability of a ceasefire mean nothing if the belligerents do not agree to stop fighting. The strategic interests of Israel and any

invading countries must be taken into account when negotiating a ceasefire. For example, if Egypt and Syria gain back territory lost in 1967, they would most likely not accept an agreement overturning those gains.

We can learn lessons from the ceasefire agreements signed after the 1967 war. The issue of territory was crucial to Israel's acceptance of ceasefire terms (territory was important to Jordan and Egypt as well, but they lacked Israel's strong negotiating position). When negotiating, for instance, Israel refused to accept a ceasefire until it had taken territory on the Golan Heights.⁶³ Strategically, Israel worried that a continued Jordanian presence on the Golan Heights would provide an avenue for future attack.⁶⁴

"I Am Not A Crook"

Despite my stellar record and repeated assurances that "I am not a crook," I find myself beset on all sides by the media, Congress, and members of the public who seek to undermine the work of our administration. Scandal has even reached my Vice President, Spiro Agnew.⁶⁵ I ask that the committee, in making decisions both on the domestic and foreign fronts, take any and all actions to protect the presidency in addition to your obligations to the United States.

The current scandal shaking my administration revolves around the 1972 presidential elections. On June 17, 1972, five burglars were arrested outside of the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate Hotel.⁶⁶ Allegedly, they were there to wiretap the

building and steal documents from the campaign offices of the Democratic nominee, George S. McGovern. Despite my Press Secretary's best attempts, it was found that all five of the burglars were associated with the administration: four former CIA agents, along with James W. McCord, Jr., the security chief of my Committee to Re-Elect the President.⁶⁷

I am certain that you are all familiar with our efforts to tamp down certain inquiries into our activities in 1972-- a public relations campaign that advertised the burglars as "overzealous anticommunist patriots," illegal campaign donations which financed the burglary, and even requesting that the FBI tamp down its investigations of what was dubbed the "Watergate Affair."⁶⁸ However, our efforts were equally combated by the *Washington Post* and its secret informant, Deep Throat.⁶⁹ In dealing with the fallout of this scandal, I consider the discovery of Deep Throat's identity to be a top priority of national security.

Earlier this year, on March 23, 1973, the Senate voted to establish the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (SCPCA) to further inquire into our 1972 campaign.⁷⁰ Our current and best defense is the use of "executive privilege", a power which allows us to keep matters of national security, such as the inner workings of the executive branch and its intelligence services, a secret.⁷¹ The committee will need to argue this end, and argue it well, if it seeks to defend our ability to maintain independence from an increasingly encroaching Congress. As major breaks in the case have been presented before the Senate, we have had to declare all previous

⁶³ "Cease-Fires," Cease-fires, Committee for Accurate Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ "Spiro Agnew," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, November 7, 2019.

⁶⁶ Rick Perlstein, "Watergate Scandal," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, July 8, 2019.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Dan Franklin, "Executive privilege," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, May 16, 2017.

White House statements on the matter “inoperative.”⁷² These hearings have been widely televised throughout the nation, as have been my steadily dropping approval ratings.

July 16, 1973 was the most critical-- and tragic-- day of the ongoing scandal. Alexander P. Butterfield, a former staffer, revealed to the Senate that all discussions of the Watergate affair were recorded on tape.⁷³ Currently, our only defense against subpoenas of the tapes has been executive privilege. It is critical that, in times of warfare, the country is not distracted by matters as trivial as a burglary, which was not the cause of my landslide victory in the election. This is a matter of precedent-- should the Senate succeed in violating our administration’s executive privilege to hold some information as secret, this may not bode well for American national security in the near-- and far-- future. We must defend our right to secrecy, not only for the sake of our administration, but for the nation’s stability and the preservation of our foundational institution of checks and balances.

Lasting Peace

Engaging the UN

Our end-goal is the negotiation of permanent and lasting peace in the Middle East. As the pre-eminent world power, we are the only country in the world with the international credibility to lead negotiations to establish a lasting peace. That being said, despite our standing and respect on the world stage, international cooperation through the mechanisms of the United Nations will be of crucial importance to our efforts. Our policy firmly supports UN Resolution 242, which was passed in 1967

after the six-day war.⁷⁴ The resolution provides a secure set of objectives and suggestions “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied,” “acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area,” and a “just settlement of the refugee problem,” amongst other goals.⁷⁵ By calling for the return of territories, Resolution 242 created the notion of “land-for-peace,” which should take center stage in any future negotiations.⁷⁶

When engaging the United Nations, we must look towards the Security Council and attempt to gain the favor of the four other permanent members: France, Britain, China, and, of course, Russia. Each possesses veto authority and can unilaterally end our attempts to negotiate peace. France and Britain would seem our most obvious allies in this process. However, having lost their territorial possessions in the Middle East, they may seek to gain from this peace at the expense of the Arabs and the Israelis. My administration has made substantial outreach efforts to the Chinese, who have been dismayed at the Soviet’s disrespectful treatment. By persuading them that the Soviets stand to lose in any peace agreement and that they would stand to gain increased favor from the U.S., we may be able to gain their allegiance. If we cannot obtain their allegiance, we must convince them to abstain from a vote. The Soviets will prove the most difficult negotiators. As Egypt and Syria’s main backers, they have a stake in the outcome of the conflict. Therefore, they must be persuaded that peace is within the interest of the entire world, including their own state.

⁷² Rick Perlstein, “Watergate Scandal,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, July 8, 2019.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ “UN Resolution 242,” United Nations.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Borders

In any peace negotiations, the borders between Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, will surely take center stage; Arab frustrations are in part due to the border changes in 1967. We must ensure that the outcome of any negotiations allows first and foremost for Israel to live unencumbered by its contiguous and non-contiguous neighbors. We must also ensure that the borders are acceptable such that Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon recognize Israel's right to exist. There are five crucial areas whose final status must be decided: Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip.

Jerusalem is perhaps the most contentious territory whose final status we must delineate. In the 1967 war, the Israelis completed the successful reunification of Jerusalem, which causes animosity to this day.⁷⁷ Although situated between Israel and the West Bank, every Muslim country in the world is interested in the outcome of these negotiations. Make no mistake, this is a gargantuan task whose success is not ensured.

We must also delineate the borders separating Jerusalem and Israel, specifically on the West Bank. After 1949, Jordan took control of the West Bank and made all Palestinians living in the region Jordanian citizens.⁷⁸ During the 1967 conflict, however, Israel gained control of the region.⁷⁹ If Israel and Jordan share a border along the lines of the holy city of Jerusalem, it may embolden Jordan in its own claims of ownership of the city. Any solution for the West Bank must take into account Israel's security. After all, although we recognize Tel Aviv as Israel's capital city, its government sits in Jerusalem.

Egypt and Israel's borders will also prove contentious. We must rule on the final status of two areas: the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Prior to 1967, Egypt controlled both the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula.⁸⁰ Israel currently controls both regions, but a strong and continued Egyptian invasion could weaken that control. Under a 'land-for-peace' settlement, Israel may be required to give up control of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. However, when delineating the final status of these two regions, our decisions must also take into consideration Western Europe. The Suez Canal, located on the border of Egypt and Sinai, is crucial for the prosperity of our allies in Western Europe. We cannot endorse or put forward any solution that would allow any actor to close or restrict movement along the canal.

Finally, we must rule on Israel and Syria's borders, specifically along the Golan Heights. Israel took control of the Golan during the 1967 war to prevent any future Syrian incursions into Israeli territory from higher ground.⁸¹ If Syria were to attack Israel, it would most likely come through the Golan Heights in an attempt to regain that territory. Syrian control of the Golan would be disastrous for Israel's territorial integrity. We may seek to create a demilitarized zone here similar to the 38th parallel separating North and South Korea.⁸²

Permanent U.S. Presence

Beyond the mere issue of peace, the events since 1967 have demonstrated that the Middle East lacks significant leadership. Given the region's strategic importance to the United States, we must devise means of ensuring that we can shape regional events to our pleasing. This will entail a broad

⁷⁷"1949-1967 Armistice Lines," mfa.gov.il, 2013.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹"Israel After the Six Day War," mfa.gov.il, 2013.

⁸⁰1949-1967 Armistice Lines," mfa.gov.il, 2013.

⁸¹"Israel After the Six Day War," mfa.gov.il, 2013.

⁸²1949-1967 Armistice Lines," mfa.gov.il, 2013.

swath of measures distributed across three arenas: military, intelligence, and diplomacy.

Militarily, we must maintain deterrent forces in the region. Nations must understand that an attack on our Middle Eastern allies is an attack on the United States. Likewise, we must use our military forces to protect our economic interests and those of our allies. The Suez Canal is of vital importance for worldwide shipping, and the recent events have shown that its protection is within our national security interest. Without a functional canal, the Gulf States will have difficulties shipping oil and gas to Western European and American markets. This could potentially cause energy shortages, which would devastate the economies of our allies and, by extension, us. Every branch of the Armed Forces has a role to play here. We should analyze significant areas in the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, Israel, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and the French Territory of the Afars and Issas with the goal of increasing the number of U.S. military bases in the region. This would strike a blow at Soviet interests in the region. After all, do not forget that the Soviets threaten the borders of Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, and Iran, a crucial oil producer and security ally. Our current forces in the region do not accurately reflect the Soviet threat.

On the intelligence front, we must take decisive action to create a strong and durable U.S. presence in the Middle East. In 1967, Israel was able to prevent an attack from its contiguous neighbors due to strong intelligence.⁸³ However, we cannot assume that Israel will always maintain this level of superiority. Thus, we must improve our

intelligence-gathering operations in the Middle East. We must focus on both human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Human intelligence entails on-the-ground, human-gathered intelligence. We ought to improve our intelligence operations in the Arab states surrounding Israel to anticipate potential future attacks. Likewise, we must increase aid to Israel for their own intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Signals intelligence consists of monitoring of communications, typically using advanced technology. We should improve our satellite and plane-based monitoring of Arab countries to better understand their troop formations and better locate areas of strategic interest. We must also improve our ability to intercept vital communications at the highest level.

Diplomatically, we must engage with all countries in the region. We must first re-establish our diplomatic presence in Egypt. Since the outbreak of conflict in 1967, we have had no formal Ambassador to Egypt.⁸⁴ That must change. Beyond Egypt, other countries in the region who have shown sympathy towards the Soviets must be engaged. Allegiance with the United States offers many more tangible benefits than allegiance with the Soviets, and every country in the region must be made fully aware of that fact.

Israel's Right to Exist & the Palestinian Question

Israel has existed precariously since its founding in 1948. None of its contiguous neighbors recognize its right to exist, even though Israel has been a full voting member of the United Nations since 1949.⁸⁵ Lasting peace must include recognition of Israel's

⁸³ "Israel Military Intelligence," *Intelligence During the Six-Day War*, 1967.

⁸⁴ Al Jazeera, "Timeline: US-Egypt Relations," *Al Jazeera*, August 19, 2009.

⁸⁵ "Israel International Relations," *International Recognition of Israel*.

right to exist by all of its contiguous neighbors.

The problem goes beyond Israel's contiguous neighbors: today, less than 80 countries around the world recognize Israel's sovereign right to exist.⁸⁶ This is unacceptable but will not change unless there is significant change in the region. Israel's neighbors hold significant sway in the international community, specifically the Muslim world.

Thus, for the international community to recognize Israel, we must first ensure that Israel's contiguous neighbors recognize its right to exist. This will entail a significant, prolonged effort from our diplomatic community.

Closely connected to Israel's right to exist is the question of the Palestinians. Since Israel's founding, many Palestinians have become refugees in surrounding countries.⁸⁷ They have vocally expressed their desire to return to Palestine.

Should we negotiate a lasting peace, we must entertain the Palestinian question. What territories rightfully belong to the Palestinians, and what level of international recognition should the Palestinians receive?

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ "Palestine Refugees," UNRWA.

Questions to Consider

1. *If lasting peace proves to be an attainable goal, what types of negotiations should the U.S. pursue?*

Will multilateral settlements negotiated under the auspices of the UN prove most effective, or should the U.S. attempt to negotiate bilaterally on a country-by-country basis?

2. *How should the U.S. involve the Soviet Union and other members of the Security Council to reach peace with a worldwide consensus without sacrificing U.S. interests in the Middle East?*

As United Nations efforts towards global, multilateral agreements increase, the United States must consider how it might reach a peaceful consensus with the Middle East and the Soviet bloc that backs it. Should the U.S. government place America first all of the time? Or should the government consider the long-term ramifications of an unsatisfying or violent conclusion to the Middle Eastern conflict?

3. *What verification measures should the U.S., the UN, the Soviets, and other relevant actors take to ensure a verifiable ceasefire and a lasting peace?*

Potential measures include monitors in key locations to ensure transparency, comprehensive diplomatic engagement with all countries, and military or peacekeeping presence.

4. *How does the process of a land for peace solution unfold?*

It is within the American interests to adopt a land-for-peace process based on UN

Resolution 242. To that end, adoption of Resolution 242 will require the withdrawal of Israeli forces from large stretches of land. What role does the U.S. play in ensuring that this occurs as planned?

5. *What is the right balance in U.S. relations with Israel and its Arab neighbors?*

The U.S. needs to make clear that Israel has a right to exist and is a valuable partner for the U.S. However, doing so must not come at the cost of isolating the rest of the region, who will surely fall under the Soviet umbrella if they feel slighted by the U.S.

6. *With the U.S.'s central position in peace negotiations, how can the U.S. improve its relations with Arab states at the expense of the Soviets without inflaming tensions?*

If war cannot be avoided, it may be prudent for the committee to view this conflict as an opportunity rather than simply regarding it as a dangerous inconvenience. What types of new alliances, diplomatic ties, and friendly relations can be achieved? How can these new ties help in the larger cause of defeating communism and ending the nuclear arms race?

7. *How activist should the U.S. be in maintaining future peace in the Middle East?*

If the U.S. chooses to reorient its military strategy to protect assets and allies in the Middle East, what does that presence look like? What does U.S. strategy look like?

Conclusion

Should war in the Middle East commence, we must take every action possible to bring it to a halt. The support of the United Nations Security Council will be invaluable in the realization of our goals, as it will provide international legitimacy for our actions.

We must first negotiate a ceasefire, or a temporary end to the conflict. Any ceasefire must be verifiable, durable, and agreeable to all involved parties to ensure its sustainability in the long run.

After a ceasefire, we must turn our attention towards achieving lasting peace in the region. This is a large question and may be beyond our capabilities. However, any lasting peace must consider the following details:

Where will the borders between Israel and its neighbors Egypt, Syria, and Jordan lie? Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and Gaza are all areas of concern.

What steps will we take to ensure that Israel's contiguous neighbors and the rest of the international community recognize its right to exist? Likewise, how will we resolve the Palestinian question?

Finally, what will the permanent American presence in the region look like going forward? The combination of U.S. allies and interests in the region necessitates permanent diplomatic, military, and intelligence operations to deter future violence.

Bibliography

- "1949-1967 Armistice Lines." mfa.gov.il. Accessed November 12, 2019.
[https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/1949-1967 Armistice Lines.aspx](https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/1949-1967%20Armistice%20Lines.aspx).
- "About Us - Policy Planning Staff - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2019.
<https://www.state.gov/about-us-policy-planning-staff/>.
- Al Jazeera. "Timeline: US-Egypt Relations." News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, August 19, 2009. <https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/08/200981710100793616.html>.
- Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.
- Brown, Harold. "The Countervailing Strategy." In *The Use of Force*, edited by Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, 3rd ed. Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
- "Bureau of Intelligence and Research - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2019.
<https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/bureaus-and-offices-reporting-directly-to-the-secretary/bureau-of-intelligence-and-research/>.
- Byron, Jim. "How Richard Nixon Saved Israel." Richard Nixon Foundation, September 8, 2016. <https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2010/10/how-richard-nixon-saved-israel/>.
- "Cease-Fires." Cease-fires. Accessed November 12, 2019.
<http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/ceasefires.asp>.
- Campbell, John C. "The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401 (May 1972): 126-135.
- Colby, Elbridge. "If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War." Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Magazine, January 28, 2019.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/if-you-want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war>.
- Cowen, Tyler. "A Nuclear First Strike Should Still Be an Option for America." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg. Accessed November 12, 2019.
<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-05/nuclear-first-strike-must-remain-an-option-for-america>.

- "Department of State Organization Chart - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.state.gov/department-of-state-organization-chart/>.
- "Deputy Secretary of State - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/deputy-secretary-of-state/>.
- "Doctrine Advisory: Control of the Air." Air University, United States Air Force. July 31, 2017. Accessed November 28, 2019.
- "Dr. John L. McLucas." U.S. Air Force, ed. December 1, 2002. Accessed November 29, 2019. <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/106248/dr-john-l-mclucas/>
- Franklin, Dan. "Executive privilege." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., May 16, 2017. Accessed November 21, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/executive-privilege>.
- Gates, Robert M. Department of Defense Directive 5100.01. U.S. Department of Defense. December 21, 2010. Accessed November 28, 2019.
- History.com Editors. "Vietnamization." History.com. A&E Television Networks, February 24, 2010. <https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnamization>.
- "Home." Defense Intelligence Agency. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.dia.mil/About/FAQs/>.
- "Home." Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/>.
- "Israel After the Six Day War." mfa.gov.il. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/June-10-1967-Israel-After-the-Six-Day-War.aspx>.
- "Israel After the Six Day War." mfa.gov.il. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/June-10-1967-Israel-After-the-Six-Day-War.aspx>.
- "Israel International Relations." International Recognition of Israel. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/international-recognition-of-israel>.

- “Israel Military Intelligence.” *Intelligence During the Six-Day War (1967)*. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/intelligence-during-the-six-day-war-1967-2>.
- Kohut, Andrew. “From the Archives: How the Watergate Crisis Eroded Public Support for Richard Nixon.” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, September 25, 2019. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/25/how-the-watergate-crisis-eroded-public-support-for-richard-nixon/>.
- Lewis, Paul. “Simcha Dinitz, 74, Ex-Israeli Envoy; Had Role in Disputed Airlift.” *The New York Times*. The New York Times, September 24, 2003. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/24/world/simcha-dinitz-74-ex-israeli-envoy-had-role-in-disputed-airlift.html>.
- Lindsay, James M. “Rally 'Round the Flag.” Brookings. Brookings, July 28, 2016. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rally-round-the-flag/>.
- McNamara, Robert. “The No Cities Doctrine.” In *The Use of Force*, edited by Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, 3rd ed. Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
- Omran, Ahmed Al. “Saudi Welcome for US Troops Reflects Relations with Mohammed Bin Salman.” *Financial Times*. Financial Times, July 23, 2019. <https://www.ft.com/content/209804d8-abc9-11e9-8030-530adfa879c2>.
- “Palestine Refugees.” UNRWA. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>.
- Perlstein, Rick. “Watergate Scandal.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., July 8, 2019. Accessed November 21, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal>
- “Policy Planning Staff - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/bureaus-and-offices-reporting-directly-to-the-secretary/policy-planning-staff/>.
- “Presidential Departments.” The White House. The United States Government. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/get-involved/internships/presidential-departments/>.
- Schelling, Thomas. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976.
- South, Todd, Stephen Losey, and Kristine Froeba. “Blast from the Past: The Pentagon's Updated War Plan for Tactical Nukes.” *Military Times*. Military Times, July 18,

2019. <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/07/10/blast-from-the-past-the-pentagons-updated-war-plan-for-tactical-nukes/>.

Spetalnick, Matt. "Trump Asia Expert to Become New Deputy National Security Adviser: Sources." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, September 20, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-adviser/trump-asia-expert-to-become-new-deputy-national-security-adviser-sources-idUSKBN1W523F>.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Détente." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., May 1, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/detente>.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Spiro Agnew." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., November 7, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Spiro-Agnew>.

"The Reunification of Jerusalem." mfa.gov.il. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://mfa.gov.il/Jubilee-years/Pages/1967-The-Reunification-of-Jerusalem.aspx>.

United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations. "A Design for Maintaining Naval Supremacy." December 2018. Accessed November 28, 2019.

"U.S. Imports from Saudi Arabia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products." U.S. Imports from Saudi Arabia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Thousand Barrels per Day). Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUSSA2&f=M>.

"U.S. Relations With Jordan - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-jordan/>.

"U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-saudi-arabia-relations>.

"UN Resolution 242." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136>.

"Under Secretary for Political Affairs - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/>.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities." *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (1990): 731-45.

Warren, James A. "U.S. Combat Advisers in Vietnam Knew the Score and Got Ignored." *The Daily Beast*, February 3, 2018. Accessed November 29, 2019.
<https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-combat-advisers-in-vietnam-knew-the-score-and-got-ignored-3>

Weiner, Tim. "Alexander M. Haig Jr. Dies at 85; Was Forceful Aide to 2 Presidents." *The New York Times*, February 20, 2010. Accessed November 29, 2019.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/us/politics/21haig.html>