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United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
Chaired by William Wen

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United Nations Security Council

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

Topic A: Framework for the Mitigation of Ethnic Cleansing in Rwanda

Topic B: Establishing Protocols for Resettlement and the International Tribunal

Committee Overview

Our committee, UNSC: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, is a historical re-imagining of the UN Security Council's role in the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide (1993 - onwards). After heavy fighting between the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Hutu-majority Rwandan Armed Forces in the Rwandan Civil War, the Arusha Accords was proposed to bring forth a new democratic government that allowed political participation by both ethnic groups.¹ UNAMIR was born in October 1993, after Rwanda and Uganda requested UN presence in overseeing the implementation of the Arusha Accords.² After less than a year of operation, the UNAMIR faced devastating setbacks ultimately culminating into a systematic ethnic cleansing of Tutsi and moderate Hutu civilians in Rwanda. Deemed as one of the largest and most brutal genocides in recent history, the Rwandan genocide led to the mass murder and displacement of millions of Rwandan civilians.³

As members of the UN Security Council, it is up to you on how UNAMIR will play its role in mitigating horrific acts of

ethnic cleansing and in assisting the recovery process. Most importantly, it is up to all members of our UNSC committee to avoid the inadequacies and major failures of the 1994 UNAMIR in our re-imagining of the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide.

Parliamentary Procedure

The UNSC: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda is a specialized committee. This means that unlike significantly larger General Assembly committees, ours will compose of 15 delegates each representing a nation that is, for the sake of the committee, part of the United Nations Security Council in 1993/1994.

Given the smaller nature of specialized committees, debates can become more engaging, intimate, flexible, and fast-paced. At every point of the committee, you will be asked to face daunting and time-sensitive crises that arise due to your own decisions. Delegates can respond to these crises in a number of different ways. As a collective committee, the cabinet can pass committee directives which will address the crisis in a more transparent method. Delegates can also pass personal directives

¹ Nantulya, Paul. "Why the Arusha Accords are Central." *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. August 5, 2015. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-why-the-arusha-accords-are-central/>

² "UNAMIR" *United Nations*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamir5.htm>

³ *Ibid.*

using their portfolio powers, shaping the crisis arc in a more personalized and discrete method. I encourage all delegates to capitalize on both of the crisis arc and to carefully consider the extent of your influences. Collaboration is key to a successful public policy, and I expect all of you to work together in addressing crises. Remember: your participation as delegates determines the trajectory of our committee sessions. Please remember to be actively participating at all times.

Standard parliamentary procedures and decorum are still in effect in our specialized committee; I expect everyone to debate with respect and courtesy, no matter how heated it may become. Debate may become looser as the committee dynamic shifts from differing crises, but I ask for everyone to remember who you are representing and how. Please also remember that UNSC: Assistance Mission for Rwanda is a historical committee; this means that our first committee session will kick off right after the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993. When conducting research, carefully consider the timeline for relevant information and position.



Topic A:

Framework for the Mitigation of Ethnic Cleansing in Rwanda

Timeline of Rwandan History

Pre-Colonial & Colonial Tensions

Prior to colonialization by western powers, Rwanda was inhabited by three distinct ethnic groups named the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The majority of the population was composed up of the Hutu (approximately 85%), while the Tutsi and Twa made up approximately 14% and 1% of the population in Rwanda.⁴ Under the Tutsi king Mwami, the Tutsi ethnic group heavily expanded control over Hutu land, laying down the foundations for ethnic tension between the two. In 1899, Rwanda became a German colony, and continued to be such until the end of World War I, when it was placed under Belgian administration by the League of Nations as a mandated territory.^{5,6}

Under the mandates of the League of Nations, Belgium was tasked to relieve the socioeconomic and political pressures within Rwanda.⁷ Although egregious imbalances of power (i.e. the jurisdiction of Mwami) were abolished by the Belgian administration, previous class divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups were maintained and reinforced as a whole. Ethnic identity cards were implemented

beginning in the 1930s to differentiate between the Hutus and the Tutsis, entrenching a separation mentality.⁸ In order to establish a native system of administration, the Belgians relied on the power dominance of the Tutsis to maintain order. A westernized education system was put in place to train predominantly Tutsi students to become administrative personnel and civil servants.⁹ Additionally, a Ten-Year Development Plan was implemented in 1952 to reform political and social structures; this, once again, presented Tutsis with greater degrees of politico-socio-economic opportunities while limiting those of Hutus.¹⁰

The Rwandan Revolution and the Rise of PARMETHUTU

Due to discriminatory policies set in place against Rwandan Hutus, ethnic tensions escalated in the 1950s, ultimately resulting in violent attacks in the tail-end of the decade. Discontented with the power imbalance, Hutu coalitions created the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMETHUTU) in 1957 to fight for majority rule in Rwanda.¹¹ Extremist Tutsi groups such as the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) subsequently arose in

⁴ "The Rwandan Genocide." *United to End Genocide*, endgenocide.org/learn/past-genocides/the-rwandan-genocide/.

⁵ Rwanda - A Historical Chronology ." *PBS*, Public Broadcasting Service, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html

⁶ "Rwanda : History." *The Commonwealth*. Accessed September 13, 2019. <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/rwanda/history>.

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Rwanda - A Historical Chronology

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ "Rwanda -- History." *East Africa Living Encyclopedia*. Accessed September 13, 2019.

<https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/rwhistory.htm>.

¹¹ Prunier, Gérard. *The Rwanda Crisis History of a Genocide*. 2nd ed. London: Hurst & Company, 2014

1959 to retaliate against aggressive Hutu initiatives. In November of 1959, a Tutsi attack on Dominique Mbonyumutwa (a Hutu sub-chief) instigated a PARMETHUTU-led revolt against the dominating Tutsi monarchy.¹² As targeted violence (specifically arson) against Tutsis spread across Rwanda, over 160,000 Tutsis were displaced from their homes. Over the next few years, more would flee Rwanda in fear of brutal retaliation by their Hutu counterparts.¹³

After the Rwandan revolution of 1959, local and parliamentary elections were conducted between 1960 and 1961. These elections resulted in landslide victories for the PARMETHUTU, with Gregoire Kayibanda becoming Rwanda's first president.¹⁴ A year later, Rwanda obtained its independence from Belgium in 1962. In this new era of independence, many Hutu officials reversed anti-Hutu policies to instead discriminate against the remaining Tutsi population in Rwanda.^{15,16} High ethnic tensions continued long after the Hutus' rise to political power as many exiled Tutsi groups in Burundi began a series of attacks against Rwandan government forces. The largest attack occurred in 1963, with Tutsi rebel groups invading into the Bugesera district.¹⁷ Governmental forces were capable of putting down the attacking rebel groups, forcing their retreat back into Burundi. In retaliation, the PARMETHUTU organized a systematic killing of over 10,000 Tutsis in southern Rwanda between December 1963 and January 1964.¹⁸

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Rwanda - A Historical Chronology

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Prunier, Gérard

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ "Rwanda (1962-Present)." uca.edu. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed September 17, 2019.

<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/rwanda-1962-present/>

Habyarimana (MRND)

Over the next decade, the PARMETHUTU retained political superiority, with Kayibanda serving presidency for another two terms. In 1973, the then Military Chief of Staff Juvenal Habyarimana led a coup d'état against Kayibanda and the PARMETHUTU party.¹⁹ After the successful coup, the PARMETHUTU party was banned and a new party – the Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le Developpement (MRND) – took over as the only legitimate political party of the new Rwandan government.²⁰ Ideologically, Habyarimana and the MRND first appealed to the masses with a seemingly moderate political agenda. Anti-Tutsi policies were initially relaxed. The government provided plans to promote peace, unity, and national development. As his presidency progressed further and further, Habyarimana returned to favoring the Hutu population. Ethnic quotas were put in place, thereby providing only 9% of all available public service occupations to Tutsis.²¹

The State of Exiled Tutsis

During the late 1970s and 1980s, exiled Tutsis in neighboring nations found it increasingly difficult to assimilate into their host states. Barred from returning to Rwanda and restricted from obtaining citizenship in nations such as Tanzania, Zaire, and Uganda, displaced Tutsis were stuck in a limbo. In the early 1980s, the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity

¹⁹ Revolvly, LLC. "Juvenal Habyarimana' on Revolvly.com." Revolvly, www.revolvly.com/page/Juv%C3%A9nal-Habyarimana.

²⁰ Pike, John. "Rwanda Civil War." globalsecurity.org. Accessed September 13, 2019. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/rwanda.htm>

²¹ Rwanda - A Historical Chronology

(RANU) was created as a starting point towards finding a permanent return of Tutsis to Rwanda.²² When the Ugandan Bush War erupted in 1980, many members of RANU and non-RANU exiled Tutsis joined the fight in support of the Ugandan National Resistance Army to overthrow Milton Obote.²³ After NRA's victory in Uganda, members of the RANU were recognized and supported by the new Ugandan government. In 1987, RANU officially became the Rwanda Patriotic Front led by Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame.²⁴

The Rwandan Civil War

In October of 1990, the RPF launched its first offensive into Kagitumba, Rwanda.²⁵ MRND government troops, with the support of Belgium, France, and Zaire, were able to push back the RPF to the northwestern border of Rwanda. However, the RPF was able to relaunch guerrilla attacks from the northwestern Vumba mountains, possibly using Uganda as a home base and funds from Ugandan political supporters.²⁶ By 1992, military pressure from the RPF and economic pressure from international aid donors ultimately forced Habyarimana to reverse his refusal to meet with RPF officers.²⁷ Under observation by the Organization of African Unity, United States, France, Belgium, Zaire, Burundi, and Uganda, the government of Rwanda and the RPF signed a ceasefire.²⁸ Peace talks continued until August of 1993, when the Arusha Accords

was signed to create a democratically elected government which included RPF representation. In addition, exiled Tutsi refugees were allowed back into Rwanda with citizenship restored.²⁹

During the peace talks of 1993, many continued militant attacks by the RPF created large roadblocks to negotiation. In order to promote peace talks, both Rwanda and Uganda requested for UN military observers to ensure that no weapons were transported across the Ugandan - Rwandan border to fuel further fighting.³⁰ On June 22nd of 1993, the UN Security Council passed resolution 846 to create the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).³¹

UN Involvement

(UNOMUR & UNAMIR)

Under UNOMUR guidelines, 81 military observers from 9 nations were stationed at the Rwanda-Uganda border as part of the UNOMUR.³² After the signing of the Arusha Accords in the August of the 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 872 for the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UNAMIR was created for the purpose of implementing and enforcing agreements within the Arusha Accords, with specific focus on maintaining security around the capital and ensuring compliance to ceasefire as elections drew closer.³³ The

²² Wm. Cyrus Reed. "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 3, 1996, pp. 479-501. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/161382

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Epstein, Helen C. "America's Secret Role in the Rwandan Genocide." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, September 12, 2017.

<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/sep/12/americas-secret-role-in-the-rwandan-genocide>

²⁷ Rwanda - A Historical Chronology

²⁸ "Rwanda: From Civil War to Genocide." Anadolu Agency . Accessed September 13, 2019.

<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/rwanda-from-civil-war-to-genocide/1104102>.

²⁹ Wm. Cyrus Reed

³⁰ "Rwanda: From Civil War to Genocide."

³¹ "UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA." peacekeeping.un.org. Accessed September 13, 2019.

https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unamir_b.htm

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

full mandate of the UNAMIR was as follows:

(a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali within a weapons-secure area established by the parties;

(b) To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedures;

(c) To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections;

(d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;

(e) To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;

(f) To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;

(g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations;

(h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police.³⁴

A total of 2548 troops were deployed into Rwanda as the main body of UNAMIR.

However, further disagreements between Habyarimana and the RPF delayed implementation of the transitional government and thus the actualization of UNAMIR's role.³⁴

The Rwandan Genocide

On April 6th, 1994, Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash on his way back from Tanzania after a series of continued peace talks.³⁵ While the culprits behind the plane crash are uncertain, it is speculated that the attack was performed by extremist Hutus who heavily opposed Habyarimana's participation in the Arusha Accords. With President Habyarimana gone, extremist Hutus and the Interahamwe (a militant group backed by the MRND) took the opportunity to carry about wide-scale killings of Tutsi inhabitants across Rwanda. The door-to-door killings were pre-meditated, with lists of soon-to-be targeted Tutsis distributed along with their addresses and personal information.³⁶ The first to go were political opponents and prominent moderate Hutus. Roadblocks were used to prevent victims from fleeing the killings, with Tutsis instantly killed upon reaching these barriers.³⁷

In addition, radio was used as a tool of propagation for the killings, as they distributed lists of Tutsis and called upon the average every-day person to participate in the mass murders.³⁸ Radio stations such as Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) aired stories detailing Hutu persecution by Tutsis prior to the Rwandan revolution of 1959 as a way to provoke Rwanda's largely Hutu population. By contextualizing the killings as a way of retaliation against injustice performed in the

³⁴ "UNAMIR." United Nations. United Nations, 1999. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirS.htm>

³⁵ Rwanda - A Historical Chronology

³⁶ Hurd, Ian. International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018

³⁷ "Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened." BBC News. BBC, May 17, 2011. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486>

³⁸ Hurd, Ian

past, these stories justified the actions of the extremist Hutus. Hate propaganda labeling Tutsis as “cockroaches” were used to spread hate and propagate the killing across the nation.³⁹ Moderate Hutus who were more sympathetic to the Tutsi population were also targeted and killed by extremist groups. The common Rwandan was given a choice: to kill or to be killed; in this way, thousands of laymen were forced to participate in the genocide not out of ideology but out of fear and reprimanding. In areas where villagers were slow to participate, militias and the Presidential Guard was dispatched to facilitate the slaughter.⁴⁰

Between the April 7th to July 15th 1994, over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed; the speed and brutality of the genocide has been largely unprecedented in recent memory.⁴¹

In addition to mass killings, rape was rampant with over 250,000 women raped during the genocide; many were also taken as sex-slaves.⁴² The RPF restarted their invasion of Rwanda as the killings began, slowly making ground towards the capital. On July 4th, Kigali fell to the RPF; the rest of the nation was captured by July 18th, effectively ending the Rwandan genocide.⁴³

As the genocide unfolded, UN peacekeepers that were stationed in Rwanda withdrew for the most part. Peacekeepers were superiorly armed compared to many of the perpetrators of the genocide, and thus many believe this decision may have cost hundreds of thousands of lives.⁴⁴ It was only two months after the start of the genocide that France, with UNSC authorization, sent troops to stop the genocide. That being said, some accused France of harboring support for the interim government.⁴⁶

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ “Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened”

⁴¹ Rwanda - A Historical Chronology

⁴² “Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened”

⁴³ Wm. Cyrus Reed

⁴⁴ “Rwanda: Justice After Genocide – 20 Years On.” *Human Rights Watch*. March 28, 2014.

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-genocide-20-years#>

⁴⁵ Beauchamp, Zack. “Rwanda’s Genocide – What Happened, Why it Happened, and How it Still Matters.” *Vox*. April 10, 2014. <https://www.vox.com/2014/4/10/5590646/rwanda-genocide-anniversary>

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Questions to Consider

1. *How can the UNSC prevent further violence within Rwanda?*

The central task of this committee is stopping ethnic violence in Rwanda, particularly in the short-term. The members of this committee must determine how forcefully the UNSC will act and the extent to which the international community has a role in this conflict.

2. *How will tensions between Hutus and Tutsis be addressed without sparking another wave of unrest and killings?*

Rwanda's recent history has been one of alternating progress and backlash. The members of this committee must take care to ensure that all sides feel as if they have been fairly treated and to ensure that different ethnic groups can live together in harmony.

3. *How can the UNSC ensure that the victorious RPF do not further enact violence against Hutu perpetrators? How can the UNSC prevent the RPF from militarily enforcing a pro-Tutsi regime?*

The acts of the Hutu militants have been fueled at least in part by perceived historic preference of Tutsis, as well as historic efforts to place the two groups at odds with each other. In your actions, make sure to consider how a new government will look and how it will treat each ethnic group.

4. *What role will UNAMIR I and UNAMIR II continue to have in Rwanda?*

The clearest mandate the UNSC has for action is the creation of UNAMIR. However, it is still up to the UNSC to ensure that the UNAMIR is swiftly and properly deployed.

5. *How will the UNSC organize the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda?*

If UNAMIR is the only way to stop conflict, there cannot be sustainable peace. Thus, the UNSC must determine when and how to properly transition the maintenance of peace back to the government of Rwanda.

6. *What key actions or lack of action from the international community allowed for the progression of the Rwandan genocide?*

To best determine how to rewrite history, delegates must first understand what went wrong. Then delegates must decide how to adjust those decisions and be prepared to respond to a new future accordingly.

7. *How can the international community respond to the growing impact of media in genocides?*

The power of RTLM in encouraging the genocide of so many is certainly shocking. If people can be driven to action from propaganda, what can the international community do in the future to control this from being used from unsavory actors?

Bloc Positions:

▪ *United States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, Kingdom of Belgium, State of Israel, Sultanate of Oman, Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Djibouti:*

The aforementioned nations, although outwardly condemning the ethnic killings spreading from Kigali, did very little to intervene during the Rwandan genocide. In fact, many munitions and light arms used during the genocide were supplied directly from China, Israel, etc. During UNSC meetings, many nations feigned ignorance regarding the state of Rwanda to avoid interacting with the issue at hand. While some nations such as Brazil strongly opposed intervention out of respect for sovereignty and to avoid domination by world superpowers, nations such as the Belgium pulled out due to their inability to contain the Rwandan genocide.

The elephant in the room, during all times of these UNSC gatherings, was the possibility of nations being dragged into a drawn-out, never ending armed conflict between the RPF and the Rwandan government – something very few nations were willing to invest.

▪ *French Republic, Canada, Kingdom of Spain, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Argentine Republic, Czech Republic, New Zealand:*

While other nations were concerned with their own state of being during the Rwandan genocide, these nations actively advocated for intervention and the preservation of civilian lives. Nations such as France and Canada contributed significant amounts of troops and military resources to the UNAMIR I and II initiatives. These resources would save the lives of thousands of civilians as they often fought to ensure the safe passage of civilian refugees. Nations such as Nigeria, Argentina, the Czech Republic, and New Zealand led the discussion of intervention within the UNSC meetings, pleading other nations to act quickly in order to preserve human lives. Their dedication to resupplying UNAMIR I and II, although eventually futile, did make material impacts on the lives of Rwandan civilians.

▪ *Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Pakistan:*

During the Rwandan genocide, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was largely absent from discussions and focused on their own national issues at hand.

Conclusion

It is evident that Rwandan history has been rife with ethnic tensions between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. This tension, aided by the tumultuous political climate and the onset of a civil war, ultimately culminated in one of history's most brutal and rapid ethnic cleansings to date. As our committee begin with the conception of UNOMUR and UNAMIR, it is your duty as delegates representing nations on the UN Security Council to address the ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. How can centuries of power imbalances and animosity be resolved by the Arusha Accord alone? How can the mandates of the UNOMUR and UNAMIR better reflect the needs of the nation? How can exiled Tutsis best find a way back to their homes - may it be in Rwanda or elsewhere? Ultimately, it is up to you all to find a way to avoid the mistakes that resulted in the Rwandan genocide.



Topic B:

Establishing Protocols for Resettlement and the International Tribunal

The Aftermath

Recovery:

After months of brutal bloodshed, Rwanda was left in shambles politically, socioeconomically, and culturally. With over 800,000 of the population killed during the genocides, many felt the repercussions of a dramatic population loss. Some estimates say that as much as 75% of Tutsi's were dead by August 1994.⁴⁷ At one point, it was estimated that 70% of the population were women, many of them widowed and forced to fill the roles traditionally occupied by men.⁴⁸ Large numbers of children were orphaned and taken in by their neighbors. Emotionally, many survivors of the genocide were wracked with grief from the loss of loved ones, severe injuries/mutilation, HIV/AIDS from rape, and a lack of proper housing or financial resources.⁴⁹ The emotional state was referred to by Rwandans as "imitima yarakomeretse", translated as "the disease of the wounded hearts."⁵⁰

The emotional trauma lasted well after the actual killings, as a culture of fear lingered:

"When you're that resigned and oppressed, you're already dead. It shows the genocide was prepared for too long. I detest this fear. These victims of genocide were being killed for so long that they were already dead."⁵¹

In addition to the emotional trauma that has taken a toll on the Rwandan people, infrastructure had also suffered due to the genocide. The fighting between the RPF and the Hutu government had decimated buildings and major roads.⁵² Pillaging had left the remaining buildings unrecognizable. With many buildings and living quarters reduced to rubble, housing inadequacies plagued the population. Many found themselves homeless and in need of new accommodations. Major lines of communication such as telephone and electrical lines were damaged, leaving many survivors without any electricity or phone service. Most importantly, water processing and distribution centers were no longer functional; even if they had remained operational, the water would still be undrinkable as bodies were often littered throughout the water supply.⁵³

⁴⁷ Gourevitch, Philip. "After the Genocide." *The New Yorker*. December 18, 1995. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/12/18/after-the-genocide>

⁴⁸ "Rwanda Rebuilding after Genocide." Global Grassroots. Accessed September 13, 2019.

http://globalgrassroots.org/rwanda_rebuilding.html

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Donegan, Eve. "The Aftermath: Rwanda in 1995." OUPblog, May 11, 2013. <https://blog.oup.com/2009/05/rwanda/>.

⁵¹ Gourevitch, Philip. "After the Genocide." *The New Yorker*. The New Yorker, June 19, 2017.

<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/12/18/after-the-genocide>

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Ibid

Additionally, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “by July 1994, half of Rwanda’s population had either been killed or had fled abroad.”⁵⁴ Many are still afraid to return home. Those that do find that little of what they once had remains. Those that remain in their host countries must also be integrated into their new home. Safety is an additional concern within these refugee camps, as will be discussed below. Beyond the victims, potential perpetrators have also fled, complicating the legal process.⁵⁵

Economically, the genocide cost Rwanda a 40% reduction of the national GDP.⁵⁶ Producing capability of major exports such as tea and coffee declined dramatically as factories were shut down. While the newly instated RPF government was eager to begin the restoration process, very little government funding was available to tackle the task.⁵⁷ 598 million dollars were pledged by numerous nations at the Rwanda Roundtable Conference in order to aid Rwanda in its restoration, but only a small fraction (94.5 million dollars) was provided months later. Over a quarter of the aid that was sent was spent on arrears on the former government’s debt, and not immediate necessities of the average Rwandan.⁵⁸

Violence continued long after RPF victory in Rwanda. As the rebel Tutsis came into political power at the end of the genocide, hundreds of thousands of Hutus fled in fear of retribution; many found

themselves in refugee and displaced persons’ camps throughout the country. The RPF viewed these camps as sanctuaries for Hutus that participated in the genocide and treated them brutally. One of the largest incidents involved the Kibeho displaced persons’ camp, where Tutsis armed forces killed 4000 refugees in retribution for the Rwandan genocide.⁵⁹ Although the initial 100-day genocide had stopped, the killings had clearly not. Tensions between Tutsis and Hutus left in the country were high, with many Hutu women barred from accessing rehabilitation aid and Hutu orphans harassed by Tutsi children.⁶⁰ Even in 2014, Rwanda was described as being in the top 15 percent of countries most likely to see mass killing.⁶¹ Clearly, violence remains a concern that must be resolved in both the short- and long-run.

After the genocide, a phenomenon termed “Gutunga agatoki” took root in the hearts of Rwandans. Meaning “showing with the finger”, many individuals started pointing fingers and accusing others of being the perpetrators of the killings.³⁸ This occurred not only among the victims but also the killers as many denounced each other to avoid imprisonment. After the genocide, property ownership became unclear as many individuals returned back home only to find others living where they once did. People would often accuse each other as “killers” in order to regain or protect their property.⁶²

⁵⁴ McKinsey, Kitty. “Rwandans take stock 10 years after the genocide.” *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*. Accessed September 13, 2019. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2004/4/40714dad1/rwandans-stock-10-years-genocide.html>

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ “REPUBLIC OF RWANDA.” National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed September 13, 2019.

<https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/Africa/rwanda.html>

⁵⁷ Bailey, Raleigh. “RWANDA: GENOCIDE AND RECOVERY.” The Office of Innovation Commercialization, February 28, 2014. <https://cnnc.uncg.edu/rwanda-genocide-and-recovery-2>

⁵⁸ Donegan, Eve

⁵⁹ Jorden, Paul. “Witness to Genocide -- A Personal Account of the 1995 Kibeho Massacre.” anzac day commemoration committee.

Accessed October 20, 2019. <https://anzacday.org.au/witness-to-genocide-a-personal-account-of-the-1995-kibeho-massacre>.

⁶⁰ Donegan, Eve

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid

It is imperative for the Rwandan government to begin rehabilitative projects as soon as possible. Infrastructure must be rebuilt, the economy needs to be kickstarted, the culture of fear and resignation must be Most importantly, the ethnic tension between Hutus and Tutsis need to be curbed in order to prevent another occurrence of the Rwandan genocide.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Prior to the Rwandan genocide, international courts had a relatively short history. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1945. All parties in cases before the court are states, not individuals. States must consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, but decisions are binding, though the ICJ lacks enforcement powers.⁶³ A perhaps clearer precedent for the international tribunal that would eventually be created to address the tragedy in Rwanda was the Major War Criminals Trial, or the Nuremberg Trials, as it came to be known. Established the same year as the ICJ, the trials were originally led by exclusively allied powers, with subsequent trials held by American military tribunals.⁶⁴ The Nuremberg trials were held in Germany and tried Nazis that had committed war crimes during World War II. While those tried included those who had coordinated the genocide of millions, genocide was not itself a separate crime, but rather a war crime

more broadly. The first trials convicted nineteen, with twelve ultimately sentenced, including some to death by hanging⁶⁵. The next major development in the development of international courts didn't occur until 1993, with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Trying individuals who had committed war crimes during the breakup of Yugoslavia, 90 individuals were ultimately sentenced, with the first indictment occurring two days before the establishment of the ICTR.⁶⁶

On November 9th, 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 955 thus creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).⁶⁷ The tribunal was created to "prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994."⁶⁸ Through the ICTR, major perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide would be tried and brought to justice. The mandate of the ICTR was limited to only terms of imprisonment as punishment for these leaders. That being said, the ICTR statute explicitly stated that heads of state and those that had followed orders in committing atrocities were not exempt to persecution.⁶⁹

The ICTR was a major judicial milestone for three reasons. First, the ICTR was the first international court of law to hear cases on genocides. Second, rape was

⁶³ Mingst, Karen. "International Court of Justice." Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/International-Court-of-Justice>

⁶⁴ "Overview." Memorium Nuremberg Trials. <https://museums.nuernberg.de/memorium-nuremberg-trials/the-nuremberg-trials/nuernberger-prozesse/>

⁶⁵ Weller, Karina. "What are the Nuremberg Trials and why do they still matter today?" *Coalition for the International Criminal Court*. <http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20160930/what-are-nuremberg-trials-and-why-do-they-still-matter-today>

⁶⁶ "International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia." *International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia*. <https://www.icty.org/>

⁶⁷ "The ICTR in Brief." United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Accessed September 13, 2019. <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal>.

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ McKenna, Amy. "Rwanda: Genocide and Aftermath." *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/Aftermath>

recognized as a crime of genocide and was formally defined in the international criminal law. Finally, media platforms were also considered a possible perpetrator of genocide and was prosecuted accordingly.⁷⁰ Given these several advancements, some credit the ICTR for providing the foundation for the International Criminal Court (ICC).⁷¹

While the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created in 1994, it was not until 1998 that the first case of former Rwandan prime minister Jean Kambanda was successfully tried, with Kambanda sentenced to life imprisonment.⁴⁴ The cases brought forth to the ICTR were typically high-profile organizers of the genocide that premeditatively organized the killings of Rwandan Tutsis. The court was not without its troubles. In 1999, Rwanda chose not to cooperate with the ICTR when it called to release Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, who led RLTM's propaganda efforts. However, a year later the ICTR dropped their request and Rwanda renewed their relationship with ICTR. The ICTR ultimately convicted Barayagwiza,⁷² along with 60 other perpetrators.⁷³ Some think that the ICTR should have gone even further, and tried more perpetrators of the genocide as well as those that committed atrocities on the part of the RPF, while others believe that it was ultimately a long and expensive process that would have been better handled directly by the Rwandan government. Regarding the former, some believe that Rwanda would not have been as willing to participate if the ICTR's reach had been expanded.⁷⁴ That being said, some believe that the decision has only made

reconciliation more difficult.⁷⁵ Regarding questions of whether Rwanda should have had a greater part in the process, as discussed below, Rwanda's trials of many of the perpetrators led to further concerns about fairness for the prosecuted.

Those of lesser crimes (i.e. taking part in the genocide to a smaller degree) were tried in Rwanda. This task, particularly given the number of judicial officials killed in the genocide and the destruction of infrastructure⁷⁶, fell upon National Courts and local gacaca courts. Meaning "justice amongst the grass", gacaca courts were community hearings, with heads of households acting as judges, and prosecuted those suspected of partaking in the killings with the goals of not only reducing the millions of cases national courts needed to hear, but also to better allow reconciliation among neighbors and help provide closure.⁷⁷ Unfortunately, both the National Courts and the gacaca courts were often ethnically biased against the prosecuted. As mentioned above, the dearth of judicial officials, particularly defense lawyers, led to many being convicted without ever having access to a defense lawyer.⁷⁸ Many had improper hearings and sentenced to imprisonment or death for their crimes.⁷⁹ In 2007, Rwanda abolished the death penalty, expediting the extradition process of suspects being held in Europe out of objections to capital punishment.⁸⁰

While the National and gacaca courts were furiously trying cases, prisons quickly filled up and were congested with thousands of sentenced perpetrators. As more and more individuals were sentenced,

⁷⁰ The ICTR in Brief."

⁷¹ Eagle, William. "In Retrospect, Rwanda Genocide Tribunal Mostly Hailed." *VOA News*, December 27, 2015. <https://www.voanews.com/africa/retrospect-rwanda-genocide-tribunal-mostly-hailed>

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

prison space quickly ran out. According to Human Rights Watch, “thousands of prisoners died as a result of extreme overcrowding and life-threatening prison conditions.”⁸¹ By 1998, over a hundred thousand prisoners were being held in prison, having never been tried.⁸² To prevent backlog within prisons, mass amnesties were ultimately given to prisoners after they had confessed and repented their crimes. Although this has alleviated some congestion within prisons, it does very little to hold accountable those that had committed heinous acts of injustice during the Rwandan genocide.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

Questions to Consider

1. As an international council, what can the UNSC do to provide material relief to those devastated by genocide?

The UNSC must determine how far its members are willing or are able to go to provide for Rwanda in this time of need. In particular, you must determine how you will work with the newly established government to rebuild infrastructure, provide services, and so forth, for the Rwandan citizens. In addition, although \$598 million in relief aid had been pledged by the international community, only a tiny fraction of the relief funds had actually made its way into Rwanda. How can international donations be better provided and used within Rwanda to aid the restoration process?

2. How can the stigma against Hutus be best addressed without inciting outrage from the Tutsi population?

Although policies have attempted to reconcile the tensions between Tutsi and Hutu Rwandans, many Hutus are heavily discriminated against and prevented from receiving aid. What should the UNSC demand of the government to resolve this?

3. How can the Rwandan government shift the “Gutunga agatoki” culture into a culture of collectivism for Rwandan reconstruction?

The culture of “Gutunga agatoki” has divided the nation indiscriminately; Tutsis are blaming Tutsis, Hutus are blaming Hutus. A sense of distrust persists among the population, hindering the reconciliation process. The UNSC must decide how to advise the Rwandan government during this time of division.

4. How will genocide perpetrators be held accountable for their crimes against humanities?

There are calls for harsh action, for the sake of retribution as well as deterrence for future atrocities. To what extent should these be balanced with concerns of reconciliation and rehabilitation?

5. How can the UNSC help provide solutions to prison overflow and impartiality issues within national and gacaca local courts?

For the legal process to be taken seriously, the courts must be seen as fair and punishments must be seen as holding actual consequences. If the UNSC cannot ensure this, the work being done may all be for naught.

Bloc Positions

▪ *United States, Republic of China, Kingdom of Spain, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Argentine Republic, Czech Republic, New Zealand:*

After the Rwandan genocide, many bystander nations changed their narrative and offered large sums of international aid to help the reconstruction of the nation. Nations such as the United States have become Rwanda's top donors, with the US Department of International Development pledging \$126 million USD.⁴⁵ Other nations such as China have openly voiced their remorse for inaction, and have taken steps to help rebuild Rwanda and to remember the victims.⁴⁶ Although millions of dollars have been pledged to Rwanda, it must be careful in its reliance on international aid.

▪ *French Republic, Canada, United Kingdoms:*

While France and Canada attempted to mitigate the horrors of the Rwandan genocide, their views on how to best bring justice to the victims of the genocide have clashed with Rwanda. They have refused to extradite perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide on the basis that the Rwandan national courts would fail to indict them to the same standards as the international community.⁴⁷ In addition, nations such as the United Kingdom have inconsistently supported the rebuilding of Rwanda; the UK's department of international development have frozen foreign aid many times to reflect their own political agendas.⁴⁸ While no nation has actively prevented Rwanda from recovering from the genocide, it is clear that the international community is not always unconditionally supportive during this recovery period.

Conclusion

As delegates, it is up to you to decide how to ultimately bring justice to the victims and perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. How the ICTR will be structured, or if the ICTR is even created within the timeline of the committee is in your hands. Problems such as prison overflow, inadequate standards in gacaca courts, and the efficiency of international court systems must be addressed from an international perspective.

Additionally, the human and economic costs of the genocide must also be considered by the committee, including but not limited to the trauma held by the victims of terrible crimes, the displacement of millions, the destruction of infrastructure, and the loss of human life. From such a tragedy, it may seem impossible to rebuild. However, as delegates you must consider how to make the impossible reality. As representatives of the UN Security Council, you all must navigate these issues while keeping in mind sovereignty of Rwanda.

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